Nordic Defence Industrial Cooperation: A Strategic Imperative

The resurgence of Russian Imperialism and war in Europe has disrupted the security order many took for granted. This is particularly apparent for the Nordic States, positioned on the frontline subject to Russian aggression and hybrid operations. The Trump Administration’s recently published National Security Strategy confirms a shift in the transatlantic alliance. The document emphasises conditional alliance commitments and a strategic realignment of US foreign policy, which has further reinforced the need for Europe to be more self-sufficient. In order to secure our region in the coming years, it is imperative that the Nordic States increase collaborative efforts to accelerate the development and integration of defence industrial capabilities.

Political Shifts and Existing Capacities
The ethical dilemmas associated with rebuilding Europe’s defence industrial base are particularly pronounced in the Nordic countries. Here long-standing moral unease about actively supporting arms manufacturing now must reckon with a harsh new strategic reality. As the European security environment deteriorates, the ability to equip national armed forces and sustain them in crisis has become an essential component of credible deterrence.

This shift marks a notable evolution for a region long shaped by traditions of political neutrality and restraint in the use of military power. Even Denmark and Norway, who were among the founding members of NATO, imposed deliberate limitations on alliance integration during the Cold War, including restrictions on foreign military bases and nuclear deployments. Yet this legacy has never fully translated into military minimalism, and some Nordic countries have instead sustained sizable and technologically advanced defence industries.

At the same time, there is no single Nordic model for defence production, and domestic defence industries differ markedly in scale and capability across the region. At one end of the spectrum stands Sweden with an unusually comprehensive defence industrial base for a country its size, encompassing the ability to design and produce entire military platforms, including combat aircraft, submarines, armored vehicles, and advanced weapons systems. At the other end of the spectrum lies Denmark, a country with a relatively limited domestic defence industrial base and a narrower set of core defence manufacturing capabilities. While Denmark has successfully built major naval platforms, such as the domestically constructed Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates, its defence industry otherwise consists largely of niche suppliers and depends heavily on integration with allied procurement processes and multinational supply chains.

Accelerating Defence Industrial Cooperation
Cooperation with likeminded partners is essential for smaller states to build and sustain a strong defence industry. The Nordic region holds promising prospects for increased defence industrial cooperation, consolidation of select capacities and the building of new shared capabilities. Avenues for partnership can be found within existing frameworks, such as the EU, NATO and NORDEFCO, and through new Nordic, Baltic or Northern European regional initiatives.

As small states with limited domestic markets, the Nordic countries stand to gain from closer cooperation in defence production. Pooling industrial capabilities would allow them to play a more meaningful role in rearmament within both EU and NATO frameworks, while mitigating the political and financial costs of national duplication. Geography further reinforces this logic. Proximity to the Baltic Sea and the Arctic generates overlapping security concerns and recurring demand for specific military capabilities, creating strong incentives for deeper industrial collaboration across the region.

Close diplomatic and economic ties provide great potential for solutions to strengthen defence industrial cooperation. There are already established practices of shared-ownership of industry and joint procurement and the Nordic defence industry is deeply interconnected through cross-border ownership. One example is the new Danish ammunition plant in Elling is operated by the Norwegian company Nammo, which is jointly owned by the Norwegian state and the Finnish defence firm Patria. Patria, in turn, is co-owned by the Finnish state and the Norwegian defence company Kongsberg.

In regard to joint-procurement, a notable example is the Swedish-Danish purchase of CV-90 combat vehicles from BAE Systems Hägglunds in 2024. Purchases of this size could not be undertaken by one Nordic state alone. Joint-procurement enables larger orders, while simultaneously providing companies security to scale their production and deepen defence ties and interoperability between the purchasing parties.

A related example is the Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS), a joint 6×6 armoured vehicle development and procurement programme, for nearly 1000 CAVS vehicles, which involves several Nordic, as well as European states and is based on the Patria platform. To support the programme, a multinational project office was established at the end of 2025 in Finland under the coordination of the Finnish Defence Forces, providing a permanent framework for joint programme management, aligned requirements, and sustained cooperation, while giving Patria the scale and predictability needed to expand production and support long-term interoperability among participating forces.

Additionally, nearly all Nordic countries cooperate on small UAS procurement through the Joint Drone Procurement Initiative. This reduces individual unit costs and strengthens avenues of innovation and technology transfer.

Disruptive Technologies and Innovation
An ever growing number of rapidly changing, technologically complex systems are continually redefining tactical and strategic realities. The future deterrence of Nordic States will be determined, to a large extent, by their ability to counter and employ emerging technologies.

Disruptive technologies such as drones, and the operational domains of cyber and space are already key features of military and hybrid operations. When examining the recent emergence of drone technology, few actors beyond Ukraine and Russia wield a proven capacity to produce, employ and network systems at scale. However, the status-quo is not permanent and the Nordics, like other European states, should make concerted efforts to develop sovereign capabilities within this domain.

Existing technological prowess and entrepreneurial ability across the Nordic Region could create an ideal environment for the cooperative development of capacities. To scale technologies from the prototype phase requires significant investments outside of the traditional procurement frameworks. Current procurement practices seldom foster innovation and are rarely compatible with start-ups developing emerging technologies. Financial institutions also have a role to play in providing capital and reshaping an investment landscape with a history of branding defence as “unsustainable.” Together the Nordics could work towards a defence technology ecosystem that rewards innovation while simultaneously strengthening the Region’s resilience and security for the years to come.

Conclusion
We believe in the future prospects and benefit for increased Nordic defence cooperation. However, significant political commitments have to be made to accelerate cooperation and integration in the Nordic Region. In addition to the suggestion above, Nordic state governments ought to align defence industrial priorities with allied partners and build defence industrial planning on a foundation of societal legitimacy.

Efforts need to be combined with EU-partners and NATO allies, particularly with the Baltic States. Together, the countries of the Nordic-Baltic 8 have already shown unity and remarkable resolve in opposing Russia’s aggression, providing the largest share of support to Ukraine in proportion to GDP. Including the Baltic States within Nordic frameworks for defence industrial cooperation would be of common benefit and should be a political priority. It would also strengthen the region’s collective bargaining and negotiating power with international stakeholders.

Finally, a comprehensive rearmament and expansion of the defence industrial base would be impossible without the long-term support of the national populations. Going forward, significant efforts have to be made to inform the public about the necessity of continued defence investment. Additionally, Nordic governments should ensure that a sizable percentage of public funds spent on defence are reinvested to grow local industry and innovation, while conducting spending with transparency to secure popular support.

In an increasingly insecure world, strengthening the Nordic’s common defence industrial base is integral to securing the future of our democratic systems, political sovereignty and way of life.

Authored by:
Isidore Brommare, YATA Sweden, Asmus Oliver Lewis, YATA Denmark, Sami Matikainen, Natonuoret