Sweden’s Arctic Strategy (2026)

Isidore Brommare

Summary

• Develop Arctic strategic resources in technology, research, space, and rare earths to facilitate Sweden’s role as a credible economic and security policy actor.
• Bridge the gap between the Baltic and Arctic as integrated strategic and operational domains.
• Increase military mobility in the Arctic and Subarctic regions in cooperation with allies.
• Advocate for the development of ambitious Arctic policies within NATO and the EU.
• Continue to pursue an ambitious policy on climate change, in line with commitments under the Paris Agreement (2015).
• Promote state adherence to international law, multilateral governance, and respect for the sovereignty of Arctic States.

The Arctic and Subarctic Regions, long perceived as areas of low tension and successful examples of multilateral governance, have entered an era of great power competition. Sweden’s new Arctic Strategy (Skr. 2025/26: 268) outlines Stockholm’s domestic and foreign policy priorities for engagement in a new era of geopolitics. The strategy is formulated along a clear geoeconomic dimension, addressing natural resources, economic competitiveness and technology as necessary prerequisites for a credible security policy. This policy brief summarises the document’s security and foreign policy implications.

Facing A New Geopolitical Reality

Sweden is repositioning itself to face an increasingly contentious geopolitical reality. This shift is apparent when compared to the last Arctic Strategy (2020), written in an era prior to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (2022–) and Sweden’s accession to NATO (2024). The previous strategy positioned Sweden’s defence policy within a national and limited regional framework. It expressed an ambition to increase military cooperation with regional partners, however, at the time it lacked the necessary frameworks found in NATO to be materially and operationally realised. Sweden’s entry into the Alliance has changed the scales and enabled Stockholm to comprehensively pursue cooperation with partners within the common defence planning of NATO.

The security of the Arctic and Baltic regions are inextricably linked, connected by actors and geography. Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO has furthered the integration of the two regions into cohesive strategic and operational domains. These developments set new requirements for Sweden to bridge the Baltic Sea Region, the Swedish Armed Forces’ primary area of operations, with the Arctic Region. Stockholm seeks to collaborate with partners in existing diplomatic frameworks, as one of seven Arctic NATO allies and one of three EU Arctic states, aiming to develop common policies and to further integrate the two regions.

NATO is increasing its operational capabilities in the Arctic. The launch of Arctic Sentry and the establishment of the Forward Land Forces Finland (FLF Finland) is solidifying the Alliance’s military capabilities in the region. Sweden, as the Framework Nation for FLF Finland, is set to strengthen its operational capabilities in the Arctic and Subarctic domains. To enable this, the expansion of military mobility connecting the military garrisons of Norrbotten and Finnish Lapland will be essential. This expansion follows the ongoing build up of Sweden’s total defence, integrating local regional development in infrastructure and logistics as a bedrock for its national defence capabilities. Sweden aims to further its contributions to NATO’s Arctic capabilities and deterrence in the region. The recent move toward procuring the French FDI frigates is set to expand the operational range of the Swedish Navy, giving a capability to provide advanced air defence and operational capabilities in the Arctic.

Furthermore, the strategy focuses on deepening cooperation with Nordic, European and Arctic allies. The Nordic states are Sweden’s closest partners in the Arctic. Enhancing collaboration within NORDEFCO and in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) are identified as prioritised frameworks for defensive capabilities and operations at the regional level. The Strategy briefly addresses recent tensions over Greenland and political concerns regarding US engagement in NATO. Instead, US interests for collaborating with Allies in the Arctic is facilitated by NORAD in response to the Russian nuclear capacity on the Kola Peninsula.

Another key component to the strategy is increasing the EU’s strategic engagement in the region. Sweden is seeking to play an active role in shaping EU Arctic Policy and utilizing the EU’s financial instruments to further Arctic regional development. This is particularly important as the EU is currently revising its Arctic Policy (2021), set to be finalised later this year. It prioritises working to engage more member states and consolidating the position of the EU in the Arctic.

Counteracting Russia

The Invasion of Ukraine has had an adverse effect on the security of the Arctic Region. Sweden’s Arctic Strategy identifies Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and its revanchist policies as the primary threat to regional security. With its allies, Sweden seeks to counteract Russian military threats and malign influence in the Arctic. Russian nuclear capacities, strategic submarine fleet and the build-up of conventional forces on the Kola Peninsula and its hybrid operations threaten regional peace and stability.

Russia continues to reinforce its military and economic infrastructure in the Arctic. China is signalling its willingness to continue developing its capabilities in the Arctic, independently and in coordination with Russia. This falls in line with Beijing’s self-proclaimed classification as a “near-Arctic power”.

Russia has both the capability and intent to increase its hybrid operations in the region, with targeted cyber attacks and sabotage against critical infrastructure. A salient example of a potential target for Russian sabotage is Sweden’s “Iron Ore Line” (Malmbanan), that traverses northern Lapland. The railway line is vital for Swedish exports of iron ore and metals. A brief cessation of traffic could have disastrous economic consequences and potentially cost billions of SEK.

To counter Russian hybrid threats, Sweden seeks to increase its coordination with allies to identify and develop common defensive response-mechanisms. A key forum for cooperation is the Hybrid Centre of Excellence (Hybrid CoE), headquartered in Helsinki. Furthermore, the “shadow fleet” and Russian energy exports in the Arctic region remain key enablers of the Russian war economy and hybrid activities. Sweden seeks to partner with allies to counteract and constrain the activities of the shadow fleet in the Arctic, in line with current sanction regimes and international maritime law.

International Law and the Sovereignty of Arctic States

Enforcing adherence to international law remains a strategic pillar in the Arctic region. A central focus for Sweden and its allied Arctic states is ensuring that non-Arctic states respect the sovereignty of Arctic nations on regional issues. While Russia’s full-scale invasion has hampered cooperation within the Arctic Council, the Council remains the region’s primary forum for multilateral cooperation. Sweden seeks to continue the Council’s work leading up to and during its own Chairmanship (2027–2029).

Leveraging Technology and Strategic Resources

The strategy identifies Sweden’s strategic capabilities in the Arctic region, including advanced digital technologies, minerals, space, polar research, and energy production. Harnessing these combined resources is essential to strengthen Sweden’s role as an economic and security actor in the Arctic.

The expansion of the mining of rare earths is viewed as particularly important for Sweden and the EU’s economic security and competitiveness. Europe is predominantly dependent on the import of rare earths from China, who effectively dominates the global supply chain. This marks a critical vulnerability in the European security of supply for computer technology, green technology, and defence materiel. The Strategy views the domestic production of rare earth metals as an issue of national sovereignty and strategic independence. With Sweden’s vast deposits of rare earth minerals in the Arctic, there is significant potential for mining ventures to strengthen the national economy, secure supply chains, and reduce European dependence on external actors.

The Strategy notably positions the expansion of national space capabilities in the Arctic as a prioritized strategic asset. Furthering the development of Arctic space infrastructure would enable greater scientific research, commercial activity for the space industry, and enhance military capabilities. In recognition of this and the growth of the European space and satellite industry, the Swedish government is prioritizing the development of Esrange as the primary launch site and satellite hub on the European mainland. Expanding sovereign space capabilities is identified as a key priority for both Sweden and Europe.

Summary: Expanded National Ambition

The new Arctic Strategy signifies a major step forward for Sweden’s strategic engagement in the region. While it addresses critical foreign policy challenges, the Strategy holds an equally vital domestic dimension, linking northern infrastructure and resource development directly to issues of national security and total defence. Sweden’s NATO-membership places requirements on Stockholm to expand its defence capabilities beyond its national borders and the Baltic Region. Bridging the security gap between the Baltic and Arctic Regions will therefore be prioritised as Stockholm seeks to engage with the regions as a cohesive strategic and operational domain.

The geoeconomic and geostrategic components of the Strategy reflects the security and economic challenges that are defining the region in an era of great power competition. Developing Sweden’s Arctic capabilities and resources in space technology, defence, rare earth extraction and infrastructure will be highly prioritised in the years to come.

In conclusion, the document is a reflection of the geopolitical challenges facing the region, signaling a historic shift in Stockholm’s Arctic policy and its intention to be a driving force for the development of proactive Arctic policies within NATO and the EU.